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  Derek Whitehead
Abstract
This essay explores the relations between perception,
phenomenology and art practice. The object of my inquiry is
the kind of perceptual repertoire available to the artist in
relation to his art, which extends beyond the technical means
available to art making in its varying forms. I invoke an artist's
innate perception as the source and locus of art's creation.
This creation of art also has an outward or phenomenological
dimension. In this respect, I investigate the ways in which
phenomenological perception, via Maurice Merleau-Ponty's
hermeneutic insights into artistic activity, might offer to
contemporary arts practice a means of reappraising its
thoughts and actions. Here I propose the artist as one who
embodies and uncovers artistic sensation: something which is
embedded in an artist's working consciousness. In addition, I
evaluate the ways in which Merleau-Ponty's perception into art
might revivify an artist's laboring body in the formative
conditions of artistic expression and how such expression
might be instructive for aestheticians in the analysis they bring
to art-making itself.
Key Words
art practice, Merleau-Ponty, perception, phenomenology, the
artist's body, the body

1. Introduction
In this essay I am primarily engaged with the treatment of
themes pertinent to aesthetics and contemporary art practice
from a phenomenological perspective. However, in the course
of my inquiry I will not propose any lessons to be learned from
phenomenology, which artists might then, peradventure, put
into practice. Nor will I persuade aestheticians of the necessity
of defining a standard position, analytical, hermeneutical or
otherwise, in regard to art practice. That is to say, I will not
propose what artists should or should not do in their art to
satisfy the claims of those outside their profession. Nor need
artists be placed in the incongruous position of having to
account for their art in ways removed from its medium and
making. The artist, it may be said, is the sole authority for his
or her work; the artist alone can act independently of
aesthetic judgments about it.
This being said, and in assaying Merleau-Ponty's perception
into art, I offer a mode of interaction and exchange with the
art practices of our times. Divergent as these practices are, it
is my wish to contribute to an understanding of the presentday phenomena of art through a kind of Merleau-Pontean
prism, to see the extent an artist's perceptual practice may be
illuminated by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological aesthetics in
an increasingly heterodox environment for creative thought
and practice. Ideally, and from an artist's standpoint, art is
concerned with the communication of internalized responses to
outward reality, responses which remain untranslatable other
than in created terms. Art is created out of an artist's

perceptual faculty, and seeks outward expression in created
form, in works of art. We say 'works of art' as if art itself were
some mysterious terrain from which, with the artist's
divination, art's workings somehow come into being.
Moreover, in aesthetic circles it is customary to think that art
is the outward expression or representation of an artist's inner
world, or of some indefinable aspect or feature of this world
which, if it were not for the powers of artistic expression or the
persuasions of aesthetic judgment, would have no real means
of commending itself to human appreciation. That art has an
outward or phenomenological dimension would seem to lend
itself to aesthetic inquiry. But what place has
phenomenological inquiry in the discipline of art-making?
Adrienne Dengerink Chaplin, a recent contributor to
Contemporary Aesthetics, , observed that both
phenomenology and art propose an account of time, space and
the world in which we live "as we live them."[1] Indeed, if art
is one very specialized mode of personal and cultural address,
then it seems reasonable to consider whether the insights of
phenomenology might offer to present-day art practitioners a
deeper insertion in/with their practices. In this respect, my aim
is to explore Maurice Merleau-Ponty's insights into bodily
perception, and artistic perception, more especially. Here, my
underlying premise is that the artist is one who embodies and
uncovers artistic sensation, something which is embedded in
an artist's working consciousness.
In this respect, a strong contrast may be drawn between the
considered consciousness of an artist and the hyperactivity of
much of our contemporary age, an age characterized by an
escalating incidence in the virtual and the hyper-real, forces
which challenge artistic agency and its affective values, bodily
processes and forms. The response to such a challenge lies in
the character of our aesthetic intelligence, that is, in our ability
to recognize the ambiguities and opportunities in the
contemporary situation so as to affirm our interdependency as
thinkers and makers in the realm of created meaning. What is
required of our thinking is a clarification of origins for thought
and practice at the level of human symbolic exchange, the kind
of interchange which takes place when aesthetic inquiry turns
intently toward artistic practice in order to learn from it.
Therefore, in examining the phenomena which art can bring
forward for critical reflection, I will draw on Merleau-Ponty's
direct engagement with the materials, skills and formal values
of the artist's profession. Merleau-Ponty addresses the artist in
material action. Thus, the very making of art enables the artist
to transmogrify perceptions into objects and ideas into
practices. Let us see, then, how the practices of bodily and
artistic perception come into play.
2. The Body and Perception
It is significant that Merleau-Ponty wanted his phenomenology
to be imbued with a new ontology of vision. In contrast to the
"confessional self-transparancy" of Sartre, Martin Jay declares,
Merleau-Ponty's fascination with perception and the visual is
"[a] heroic attempt to reaffirm the nobility of vision on new
and firmer grounds than those provided by the discredited
Cartesian perspectivalist tradition."[2] With such a project in
view, Merleau-Ponty argues for the necessity of a return to

ontological questioning and its ramifications: to the subjectobject question, the question of intersubjectivity and the
question of Nature. Merleau-Ponty proposes an outline of his
ontology projected as an ontology "of brute Being and of
logos," and argues that an Ursprungsklarung, an originary
clarification, is required that attests to our incarnate
subjectivity within the Lebenswelt (the Life-World). He
stresses that a subjectivity and an intersubjectivity must be
reached which enjoys "both solidity and completeness in the
mode of the Lebenswelt."[3]
What is also affirmed is the expression of the human body as
a lebewesen, a living creature, in all its enfleshed totality.
Moreover, in seeking after the nature of visible things, we tend
to rely on the structural components of our perception, as did
the Gestaltists, who embarked on research into what they
described as the circular, interactional character of sense
experience, an approach which Merleau-Ponty thinks is more
sensitive to "the acting mind," as distinct from the
intellectualist categories of the neo-Kantians.[4] The essential
relational structures of perception and expression are identified
by Merleau-Ponty as necessary sources for critical reflection,
for they propose new horizons onto the nature of creative
subjectivity and a renewed focus on the elements which
constitute the expressive life.
In this respect, Merleau-Ponty speaks of something that
underlies our perception and expression, as well as
undergirding all our conceptualizations of the observable
world: a "primordial (or primary) order of signification." The
phenomenal structures we see about us are not independent of
our own "constitutive powers"[5], for they appear in the
organic history of humankind. These constitutive powers have
creative potential. According to Merleau-Ponty, the world of
bodily being is governed by the relations of perception and
expression. Such relations give us access to human
subjectivity, and to the elements of expressive life. We are
thus called to what Terry Eagleton describes as the fleshly
self: ". . .to the situated, somatic, incarnate nature of
being."[6] Merleau-Ponty envisions what I would call, a
schematic ontological aesthetics: an account of aisthēsis and
its material substantiations, whereby the body is incarnated in
the world in such a way that sensory experience is predicated
upon it as an embodied entity. This embodiment involves the
twofold dynamic of perception and expression. Moreover, it is
in the operation of expression itself, Merleau-Ponty says, and
"begun in the least perception," which "amplifies into . . .
art."[7] It is this which constitutes the force majeur of artistic
exertion, this tripartite relation of perception, expression and
creation.
What is interesting is that which lies before expression and
sustains it from behind. Expressible meaning, if I may so put
it, is the articulation of what sustains expression behind the
constructions of workaday consciousness. Moreover, it is these
insights into the nature of the body, and the sensations
associated with perceptual practice, that distinguishes "the
artist's vocation" in the world. Further, the laboring body is
what characterizes an artist's being-in-the-world. Expressing
what exists is an endless task, Merleau-Ponty says, a task
which is attributed to the artist who, to an exemplary degree,

is capable of penetrating to the sources of things beneath their
surface appearances.[8]
Certain questions arise for us at this point, and artists or
viewers may be inclined to give their own responses. What
connections or dissimilarities might there be between the
body, your body and the bodily existence of an artist? What
distinguishes the artist, whose body is interconnected with the
world, from the bodies of other people? Is the artist's body
more deeply connected, or are artists connected to the world
in different ways than others? If artists are more connected,
what accounts for the difference? What kind of
interconnections might there be between artists and viewers?
What unique abilities do artists possess, and what
responsibilities do artists have given their abilities?
First, it is worth noting that in his essay "," Merleau-Ponty
gives us an image of an artist's body within a milieu of
interactive corporeality. He declares that the artist takes his
body with him. He writes, "It is by lending his body to the
world that the artist changes the world" into works of art.
Moreover, he writes, ". . .to understand these
transubstantiations we must go back to the working, actual
body, [to] that body which is an intertwining of vision and
movement."[9] This overlapping of vision and movement is
central to Merleau-Ponty, in that it situates the body - the
living and enacting body - in the drama of sentient life. But
where does the artist take his body? He takes it into the
world, and before the world of his work.
More generally, if our body is a visible entity in the world, such
that we "steer it through the visible," as Merleau-Ponty
declares, then the body is a part of the visible order within a
constituted whole. Merleau-Ponty continues, "Visible and
mobile, my body is a thing among things; it is caught in the
fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But
because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle
around itself. Things are an annex or prolongation of itself
[which means] the world is made of the same stuff as the
body."[10] Here, Merleau-Ponty writes that things and the
body share the same elemental constitution, whereby things
find their repetition in the body by some sort of secret
visibility.
Indeed, for the artist at this point, and for Paul Cézanne,
Merleau-Ponty declares, "Nature is on the inside." As Hugh
Silverman also argues, Merleau-Pontean vision, understood
here in terms of visibility, is "nature at work.". Whence, such
things as "quality, light, color, depth, which are there before
us, are there only because they awaken an echo in our body
and because the body welcomes them."[11] And, we might
say, an artist such as Cézanne welcomes them to a superlative
degree.
Moreover, one way of distinguishing the artist's vocation from
non-artists, that is, the artist's particular bodily vision and
orientation, is to say that the artist gives him- or herself over
to the work at hand, to the conception and realization of a
material work of art. What distinguishes the artist's perceiving
body from the rest of us? One thing can be said: An artist's
vision is not a view superimposed on an outside, as with most
non-artists who naturally construct the world from a central

focus of the self; neither is an artist's perception a mere
physical-optical relation with the world. Indeed, "the world no
longer stands before [the artist] through representation";
instead "it is the [artist] to whom the things of the world give
birth by a sort of concentration or coming-to-itself of the
visible."[12] This is so for Merleau-Ponty because things have
an internal equivalent in the body. But in the case of artists,
these inner equivalencies give rise to a second order of the
visible, shapes or images, in that an icon or essence appears
which represents the first or primal order of things in creative
action.
What abilities do artists possess here, and what responsibilities
do they have? Merleau-Ponty says that it is the artist to/within
whom the things of this world give birth by a sort of selfforming of the visible. It is as if this first-order of the visible
arises internally within the artist's consciousness, only to be
projected back again among outward realities. But even where
the world no longer stands before the artist through
representation, an artist's representations in created work,
whether literal or abstract, are never in their essence merely
representations of reality. Thus artistic representations are
unique among human representations, in that an artist's work
must faithfully correspond with reality as he perceives and
experiences it, and must create something within/from reality,
even a totally new reality, in all its varied intensities.
3. Vision and Making Visible
Merleau-Ponty believes that an artist's vision "learns only by
seeing and learns only from itself." The artist's vision is a
schooling in seeing. In this, the artist remains a student of his
own work. Moreover, the artist is one who is animated by the
very inadequacies which "keep [or prevent] the world from
becoming [a work of art],"[13] and by the very possibility of
their transformation, as Merleau-Ponty has poignantly said.
This suggests that an artist is charged with the work of
restoration: with restoring the world (to itself, to us) through
the transmutations of his or her eye and hand. What unfolds
here are very pertinent abilities and responsibilities taken on
by the artist, for such transmutations are made intelligible
through the exigencies of created work. But what are these
urgencies of created work, and how might they influence the
viewer's perception?
Speaking concretely, once a created work of art has left the
solitude of the studio for a more public space, it may still pose
resistances to our thought, still insist on withholding its sight,
its secrets, from view. Here, we advert to the secret incipience
(or birth) of things in a work, things which solicit us through
our perception. Correspondingly, there is also the secret
genesis of things in an artist. For, as Paul Klee once declared,
"[T]he artist does nothing other than gather and pass on what
comes to him from the depths. He neither serves nor rules he transmits." For Klee, that which comes to an artist from the
depths - from his own interiority - culminates in creative
transmission, another feature which distinguishes itself from
non-artistic activity. In his Creative Credo, Klee's concern is
"not to reproduce the visible but to render visible"; that is, to
articulate the remote starting-point of creation: the beginnings
of supernal things in consciousness.[14]

Something of this potent encounter with the depths is also
evoked by the artist Max Ernst, when he writes: "Just as the
role of the poet [consists in writing under] what articulates
itself in him, the role of the [artist] is to grasp and project
what is seen in him."[15] Wieland Schmied has said that
Ernst's concern was with a "mechanism of inspiration," the
aim of which was to discover "a method of establishing a
poetic objectivity;" that is to say, to "banish reason, taste and
conscious will from the making of the work of art," and for the
purpose of producing works that "are never consequences,
final [or] unavoidable." Instead, such works "[remain] open,
they are proposals, methods, [and] processes."[16] Ernst
believed that the artist grasps and projects what is seen in
him, perhaps something which sees itself in him, and which
must therefore show itself in, through and for him.
Works of art produced in this way are provisional, but also
consequential, processes of an artist's ongoing discoveries. For
if the poet gives voice to what articulates itself in him, as if by
some mute divination, then the poet, and the artist, are
similarly drawn to what W. S. Di Piero has called, "imagemaking activities," "'ways of working materials." A painter's
material really is material, as Di Piero rightly says. Poets "do
thought work and make thought things." Moreover, "[the]
sensation of bringing a poem into existence is so much like the
imaginative exertion of making a physical image that poetry,
in its becoming, aspires finally to the manifest and sumptuous
imperfectabilities of painting and sculpture."[17] Ernst's and Di
Piero's emphasis on what must be grasped and projected from
within an artist shows a certain compulsion felt by the artist
that must find its own inscrutable way toward realization.
To speak of an artist's perception is to approach a mode of
seeing and sensing which is characterized by the relations of
surface and depth. That is to say, such relations celebrate
what Merleau-Ponty calls an enigma, that of visibility itself. An
enigma is a puzzling thing, a riddle or a paradox. How does he
defend this? To see is ". . . to have at a distance," MerleauPonty says. To see is to have or possess things at a distance;
that is to say, the way in which we observe things at a
distance brings them into focus for us. But depth is both
"distance and proximity,", for Merleau-Ponty. Depth is the
means by which we have access to a visible world, but only
because depth is concealed from us. Depth is the unnoticed
background to all our seeing. In a word, for Merleau-Ponty,
depth, is always the dimension of the hidden. To see ordinarily
is to apprehend the surfaces of things, not their depth. But to
see from the viewpoint of perspective implies depth: depth at
a distance, depth as distance. If this is true for our ordinary
seeing, then the artist is one who strives to capture something
of depth's inarticulate possession of visible things, revealing
their qualities in the gestures and representations of created
work.[18]
A question arises. Do Klee and Ernst embody the kind of
artistic labor which a phenomenological account of art practice
suggests is able to influence our perceptions of and within the
world? Are there those who fail to influence perception in this
way?
In reply, we should never undervalue the artist's particular

labor and study, Merleau-Ponty says, that labor which is "so
like an effort of thought and which allows us to speak of a
language of [art]."[19] Such an effort of thought enables the
artist to enter what André Malraux has called "another world."
But for Merleau-Ponty entry to another world means that world
which the artist sees and which speaks his language, but also
one that is freed from the anonymous weight which holds it
back and keeps it equivocal.[20] For how could an artist or
poet do anything other than express his or her engagement
with the world. Thus the creative impulse always
communicates something. Such communication "is a new
system of equivalencies which demands [a] particular
upheaval, and it is in the name of a truer relation between
things that their ordinary ties are broken."[21] However, Paul
Crowther may be correct in his view that for Merleau-Ponty to
describe the artist's creative communication as one of
"equivalencies" is to underestimate the artist's "deviations
from perceptual norms," or their possibility, in the fuller
articulation of a work. Such equivalencies, Crowther argues,
are a voicing of Andre Malraux's "coherent deformations"[22]
in which the artist, through a given medium, brings to a fuller
recognition those forms that solicit his or her perception.
If the breaking of the ordinary ties between things is in the
interests of a truer harmonization, then this has compositional
force for the artist. Here we recognize Merleau-Ponty's sense
that the artist is one for whom the objects of the world give
birth by a concentrated coming-to-itself of the visible. For
example, the combination of simultaneous views of a given
object, as in Cubist abstraction, do more than constitute a
pictorial analytic statement. What we look at in a Cubist work
is a field of properties: a distribution of color, texture and
form. What I see in such a work is an arrangement of
elements, not identifiable things, but things without their skin.
Here an artist may take ordinary things -- domestic objects,
for instance -- and recast their outward appearances into nonrepresentational forms. Equally, an artist may be simply
enthused with fashioning and contemplating the forms
themselves, with no reference to, or inspiration from, ordinary
things in themselves.
However, for Merleau-Ponty, a truer relation between things is
in the interests of a vision which has become finally free. Such
freedom "throws out of focus and regroups objects of the
world for the [artist] and words for the poet." But throwing out
of focus and regrouping the objects of a world is not a
freedom readily achieved. Rather, it is rather like the
bequeathing of "new organs for a new task."[23] For MerleauPonty, then, it is merely that "an artist's going further at the
moment he creates no longer indicates some reality he must
go towards, but rather what still must be done in order to
restore the encounter between his glance and the things which
solicit it, the encounter between the [artist] who has to be and
what exists."[24] This active engagement between the artist
who has to be and what exists is in a constant state of flux, in
that the artist's glance is always approaching things but never
fully apprehending them in their inter-sensorial connectedness.
Such a glance is drawn back again and again toward the
inviolability of things, devoid of their possession.
Perception breaks open the world as a surgeon opens up a

human body, "catching sight of the organs in full functioning,
taken in their activity." This is reminiscent of Michel Foucault's
"medical gaze," the ways in which a practiced medical eye can
judge the character of a bodily malady. Here again perception
is not a perception of things, but rather of elements, "of things
which are dimensions; I slip on these elements and here I am
in the world."[25] Similarly, when an artist apprehends the
world in the openness of perception, s/he perceives the traits
of immediate things. The artist is, like a surgeon, in search of
what might be called an unexplained familiar: a sense that
there is on this occasion more to this thing or that body than
actually meets the eye, of the organs of a thing or body taken
in their elemental entirety, the whole portending as yet
unrecognized relations.
In this respect Merleau-Ponty speaks of "the perceived thing,",
the object unfolding before our eyes. Further, the perceived
thing, such as a work of art, awaits the kind of response that
would receive the diversity of its aspects from other points of
view. As Jacques Taminiaux has observed, a perceived thing
acquires its unity and identity from the very diversity of its
aspects; the unity of the perceived thing springs from this very
diversity. Taminiaux comments that the perceived thing "would
lose its perceptual density, its incarnated existence, and would
cease to be perceived if the aspects that are presented by it
did not announce other aspects, which are not yet offered to
sight. These latent sides", he says, "form the horizon hidden
by the first ones."[26] It is the forming of an horizon or
purview onto a thing's latent sides which directs an artist to
look for those aspects of a thing which are hidden from view
as dimensions to be plumbed, the deeper and denser his own
perception becomes.
Alongside an object's perceptual density, we strive for an
understanding of its incarnate existence. Merleau-Ponty says
that we acquire some "sensible understanding", because the
perceptual is always given with "sense experience (le sentir),
with the phenomenal," and with "the silent transcendence." He
thus identifies a basic issue for philosophy when it encounters
the silent reality of things, when, in fact, it encounters art:
"[H]ow every philosophy is language and nonetheless consists
in rediscovering silence."[27] But in what ways might this
expectant openness forged for us by the silent awareness of
sensory things be mediated through an artist's bodily practice?
4. The Artist's Body and Contemporary Practice
One of the complexities embedded in contemporary art
practice is precisely how artistic expression can be devoid of
simulacra - a shadowy likeness, a deceptive substitute, a mere
pretence - if Merleau-Ponty's "visible" and its "internal
correspondences" have been jettisoned from view. I am
thinking of the kind of performance art which immobilizes the
body in favor of micro-technical effects, for example, in the
works of Australian performing artist, Stelarc[28], and other
proponents of the body as technologistic. (See
www.stelarc.com.)
Here there is an implicit claim to have enhanced the body's
interactive potential through computerized intelligences, where
mechanized insertions into an artist's body - the use of electric
probes, for instance - mirror or control its movement. Such a

body is a purported site for praxis, but there is a danger of
reducing this body to a state of passive compliance through
simulated methods of cybernetic command. Such a bodily
condition suggests, by a kind of subterfuge, what Terry
Eagleton questions: "[T]hat the body must be somehow
marked or signed in order to enter narrative, [to] pass from
brute fact to active meaning."[29]
Reclaiming the body as an enlivened sensory field would be
possible for performance practice if it were once again to
enjoin the living body, bringing together the powers of bodily
and artistic representation as they combine in an outwardly
intelligible communication. Such practice would thus stand
instructed about itself by just such a repossession of the
conjunction of brute fact and active meaning. Indeed, we see
something of the potency of this doubling potential in the vital
actualities of mime theatre and dramatic dance, where there is
a conscious overlapping of physicality and sensibility. Such
engagement, by which an artist's body is moved to a high
degree of mental and physical concentration, as in modern
dance, is nevertheless as elusive as it is demonstrative, for it
both evokes and conceals the body's technical achievements
realized through the oscillations of pleasure and pain. Such a
schema has parallels with what Merleau-Ponty calls the
sensory "in-visible": that aspect of discernable things,
including bodily behavior, that is ordinarily concealed from
view.
It is necessary to understand what Merleau-Ponty means more
precisely by the terms 'visible' and 'in-visible' as they have a
direct bearing on human perception. Perceptually speaking, we
can identify the sensory visible: the things before our sight,
such as other bodies. But there is also the sensory in-visible,
phenomenology's invisible lining (or membrane) of the visible.
What is more, this in-visible resists our attempts to seize it,
Merleau-Ponty suggests. Every attempt to grasp it makes it
disappear. The in-visible appears only within the visible, he
says. Further, the in-visible inner lining of the visible is the
means by which things, including bodies, hold to themselves.
But how, it might be asked, is Merleau-Ponty's in-visible to be
apprehended in ways that might illuminate art practice? We
have a clue here. The German lyric poet, Rainer Maria Rilke,
speaks of an artwork, a visible thing, bearing the very private
and intimate singularity of "the one who must make it," the
artist. Such a singularity makes its entry so as to "find its
justification in the work and reveal the law in it," he writes,
"like an inborn drawing that is invisible until it emerges in the
transparency of the artistic."[30] We might say, then, that an
artwork has an inborn line which is invisible until it issues in
the crystal transparency of its image.
This notion of the in-visible may be characterized by artmaking in the multiplicity of its signifying practices, practices
that draw on an artist's intuitions into the nature of sensory
things and that he celebrates as equiprimordial (equal) with
thought. As alluded to earlier, Silverman argues that MerleauPonty's idea of vision, understood here in terms of visibility, is
"nature at work." Thus, he says, our task "is to take thought
to the spatiality of vision," a space in which vision "reassumes
its fundamental power of showing forth more than itself."[31]

Here it is the privilege of the artist to account for this morethan-itself of vision, its superabundance, in the gratuities of
created work. But how might this thrust toward some supersensible perception find its place in contemporary art-making?
Speaking in the 1980s, Craig Owens once claimed that the
postmodern artwork unsettled the stability of "the modernist
mastering position"; its authority was not based on its
uniqueness or singularity, he said, but on modern aesthetics'
attribution of the universal forms "utilized for the
representation of vision";[32] and this beyond any differences
in content due to the production of works in actual historical
conditions. Not only does postmodernist work claim no such
authority for itself, Owens argued; it is intent on undermining
it, hence "its generally deconstructive thrust."[33] Here, a
deconstructive mechanism introduced into art-making
postpones or cancels judgment along Modernist lines.
For its part, contemporary art has moved away from a
predominantly conceptual stance to one of avowed public
profession. Contemporary artists have been induced to leave
the solitude of their studios and engage with the social order.
Such artists now deal with a demanding repertoire of social
tools and art institutional prerogatives in the exhibition of their
work. Contemporary art and its diverse applications have
taken on a definable public space. Such space has become the
artist's studio en plein-air, an overt mode of being and
making. Of course, interactivity, which should mean time for
people to reflect on what is before them in conducive environs,
is axiomatic to the artist who wants to "create an audience,"
as Paul Klee once remarked. [34] However, the attempt to
create an audience requires the enactment of a discourse, one
which recognizes the artist as mover and shaper of his
creations. For, inasmuch as discourse is the articulation of
social and cultural forces as they find expression in individual
practices, then discourse constitutes a critique of power,
whether of art or life.
Nowadays, the evident materiality of an artist's discourse must
be allowed to forge open-handed aesthetic values, so that we
learn to interrogate those practices that are at odds with
themselves, or with the world, and why this may be so.[35]
Martin Heidegger's intuition, in his On the Origin of the Work
of Art, which insists on an artwork's "work-being" rather than
its "object being,", may yet transform our experience of
sensory things into visionary engagement, and thus open
contemporary art to a more humanizing critical reflection.
Whereas our present historical moment is one of conflicted
truth and heterogeneous appearances, the contemporary artist
is one who remains to mould this world's latent meanings and
undisclosed truths.
Moreover, the direction of contemporary media suggests that
things, in order to exist, must somehow enter our visibility.
Things are said to exist, are called into existence, by a kind of
mechanized rationality that adheres to a strictly linear way of
thinking. Commentators as diverse as Lyotard, Baudrillard and
Silverman have noted that linear rationality remains a priority
in the promotion of a kinetic and televisual culture. Here
everything must have or be a new means of constructing
perception from the standpoint of individualistic consumption.

How, in such circumstances, are artists to reinvigorate the
depths underlying ordinary vision? By affirming, in marked
contrast to the arbitrary and the simulacral, the contrasting
energies of real-time material praxis: of bodies, rhythms and
events. Artists can seek a corrective here: an encounter with
life that mirrors back to us something of Heidegger's sense of
a artwork's "coming-to-presence" and "abiding": of an
earthing of art amidst the competing forces of politicized
visualities.[36]
Contemporary art has a demonstrative physicality, a
topography, we might say, in that it writes, maps, or projects
itself into material space through eruptive strategies. Much
contemporary art is seen as a drive toward obscurity, having a
will to enigma, to unintelligibility or to uninterpretability, as
Donald Kuspit has claimed.[37] But is this so? Defenders of
contemporary art speak of the ways in which assemblage art,
installation and multi-media art (video, audio, and film art)
and certain modes of performance art manage to instate some
guiding motif at the organizational centre of its perceptual
field, such that new resonances, balances and tensions
emerge, thus saving its composition, or design, as Charles
Altieri would have it, from "willfulness" or mere "ornamental
status."[38] However, authentic art practice, which
demonstrates a will to veracity, is also the practice which finds
a legitimate place for the illogical and irrational. Such practice
takes our reason and aesthetic judgment to a threshold where
artworks take on nonobjective values and unrecognized
meanings, demonstrating art's power to work its way through,
and often against, the contingent mental spaces of theoretical
discourse.
Some contemporary art maps the ways in which
heterogeneous elements, found objects, ready-mades and
human artifacts operate within some larger enveloping idea,
whether in the box-like containments of the Polish artist
Mateusz Fahrenholz, for example, or the exploded assemblage
environs of the British artist Cornelia Parker. (See websites
www.englandgallery.com/FAHRENHOLZ_Mateusz.htm and
www.frithstreetgallery.com for examples of their work.) For
Fahrenholz, it might be said, the space of assemblage is a
vehicle for an examination of the objects of domestic
attachment transmuted by memory or imagination, while for
Parker, found objects and artifacts become the site of a
ritually robust profession.[39]
Moreover, the idea of art's space as topological offers us a
model for a more reflexive art practice. To produce a work of
art is not to produce something from nothing, as MerleauPonty insists. A visible work of art, an artwork which is made
visible, is but "the trace of a total movement of Speech," he
says, and this movement contains the expressive operation
(my expression) and that of other artists.[40] This movement
gives voice to a performative process, an artist's alignment of
materials, energies and sympathies within the paradoxical
nature of expression itself. Here, it seems to me, the
contemporary artist can begin to work within freely chosen
parameters only by occupying some outpost of thought and
practice which portends a clearer view. For it is what remains
unthought in art, those human realities that art has yet to
aspire towards, that poses an existential challenge to art and

its making. Furthermore, contemporary art-making can learn
to resist those market forces which promote the coercions of
the image as style, an anti-praxis of sorts, that is mirrored in
the excesses of art theory. By contrast, it is by turning the
created image toward its co-constituency in the in-visible,
Merleau-Ponty's membrane or inner lining of the visible, that a
truer eye will be formed. Such an eye can facilitate our release
from perceptual indeterminacy in a revitalized encounter with
event and time as we experience them.
5. Conclusion and Prognosis
How might some sought-after equality of art and thought work
itself out in contemporary terms? Again we turn to philosophy.
Philosophy has never spoken of the passivity of our activity, as
Merleau-Ponty puts it, because "new as our initiatives may be,
they come to birth at the heart of being, [and are] supported
on the pivots or hinges of our life, their sense is a
'direction'."[41] If this is so, then we have committed
ourselves to using the project of an incipient aesthetic, of an
access to created things through the solicitations of an artist's
eye. Such an eye has the ability to bring the dynamics of the
pre-conceptual world, the artist's subconscious image-world,
to an indirect insertion among the signs and structures of
contemporary living, thus keeping open and poised for
hermeneutical evaluation "the hither side of experience," as
Merleau-Ponty defines it, that region which is so close or
familiar to us as to escape our conscious attention.
Consequently, artistic practice, conceived as an artist's eye
placed within depth and among things, fosters for us as
viewers a distinct way of being perceptual, of sharing
something of the artist's perception in and of the world. Such
perception is a counter-dynamic of a significant kind, just as
art, historically and contemporaneously, is invariably a
counter-dynamic in one way or another. Ideally, a counterdynamic is a thrust toward, an exigency which fractures open,
both dissemblances and obscurities, whether in art or life.
In the final analysis, have Merleau-Ponty's insights into artistic
perception offered contemporary arts practice the scope for a
necessary reappraisal of itself? Here, the main point about
contemporary art is that Merleau-Ponty's analysis of artmaking remains viable and efficacious, even when considering
the different technologies employed by artists in their work,
though it may be surmised that artists, according to ability,
inclination or commitment, engage with the rigors of creative
bodily practice in varying degrees. However, it is not a
question of who or what may be deviating from authenticity in
this regard: authenticity will mean different things to different
people. It is more an issue of recognizing what the
personalized perceptions and intuitions actually are that guide
and sustain artists in their daily working lives. While not
drawing any concluding evaluative judgments about what
constitutes authentic art practice in this respect, for much art
these days is deliberately open-ended, it may reasonably be
said that in delineating the ways in which Merleau-Ponty's
phenomenology can be understood and applied to
investigating the bodily being and creative processes of an
artist, some keener light is undoubtedly shed on the dynamics
and direction of modern art and, by imaginative extension, the

contemporary art of our own times.
This essay has argued that, while practicing artists have
grounds for reservation about the applicability of aesthetic
theory to their discipline, Merleau-Ponty does illuminate artistic
consciousness to a compelling degree, and to this extent his
perceptions into art have the capacity to revivify an artist's
sentient awareness in and through creative expression. His
specific approach to the body, and more especially, to the
artist's body, encourages us as artists and non-artists to be
more attuned to one another in our search for clarity, meaning
and beauty in the formative conditions of artistic expression
and aesthetic investigation. Phenomenological inquiry may
thus be seen as an important way of opening up renewed
dialogue with contemporary art practices, emboldening the
artist's eye to engage more fully with the forces of
contemporary culture in interrogatory and restitutive terms.
Will such an eye be forged for creative practices in our times?
Only in so far as the subjects of such an eye compose the
artist's eye in the making of his or her own work.
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